The friends of nothing may be divided into two distinct though not exclusive classes: the know-nothings, who claim a phenomenological acquaintance with nothing in particular, and the fear-nothings, who, believing, with Macbeth, that nothing is but what is not, are thereby launched into dialectical encounter with nullity in general. [For Heidegger, the fear of death is a fear of total annihilation, a fear of nothingness.] For the first [for example, Sartre], nothing, so far from being a mere grammatical illusion, is a genuine, even positive, feature of experience. We are all familiar with, and have a vocabulary for, holes and gaps, lacks and losses, absences, silences, impalpabilities, insipidities, and the like. Voids and vacancies of one sort or another are sought after, dealt in and advertised in the newspapers. [By advertising vacancies, he means something like Apartment for Rent.] He concludes the article:

If nothing whatsoever existed, there would be no problem and no answer, and the anxieties even of existential philosophers would be permanently laid to rest. Since they are not, there is evidently nothing to worry about. But that itself should be enough to keep an existentialist happy. Unless the solution be, as some have suspected, that is it not nothing that has been worrying them, but they who have been worrying it. Copyright (cid:211) document in whole or in part for any purpose whatever, provided only that acknowledgment of copyright is given. 1996 by Paul Vincent Spade. All rights reserved. Permission is hereby granted to copy this As an illustration of Sartres view, consider the notion of distance. (Sartre himself uses this example at the end of IV of the Chapter. What this notion of distance. It will play an important role as things develop in our account.) Think of the road between Bloomington and Indianapolis. There are two ways we can think of this road:

(1) We can think of it as the road, which is terminated at one end by Bloomington and at the other end by Indianapolis. If that is the way we are looking at it, then the road itself appears as positive, whereas the end-points are negative: they are where the road terminates. (2) Or we can think of the same configuration as consisting of Bloomington on the one hand, and of Indianapolis on the other, and the road is what separates them. If that is the way we are looking at it, then the two end-points appear as positive, and the road itself now comes on as negative. Recall the Gestalt figure we discussed earlier, and how we can flip-flop from one way of viewing it to the other. Both in the case of the Gestalt figure and in the case of distance, we are the ones who make the overall phenomenon what it is for us. Now the notion of distance (viewed in either way) is one of those phenomena Sartre calls ngatits. They are beings that appear to us riddled with non-being.

The Origin of Nothingness We are now ready to look at V of Chapter 1, The Origin of Nothingness. We already know roughly how this is going to go: (1) Nothingness cannot come from being-in-itself, as weve seen. (Being-in-itself is purely affirmative, and doesnt do anything.) He goes on: (2) Neither can nothingness lacks, absences, etc. produce itself, or as Sartre says, nihilate itself. The second claim is part of what Sartre develops in the preceding section. Basically, it is a criticism of Heidegger. Heidegger had said, Das Nichts selbst nichtet. That is (roughly), Nothing itself noths. (Rudolf Carnap had a lot of cheap fun at the expense of this phrase.) Copyright (cid:211) document in whole or in part for any purpose whatever, provided only that acknowledgment of copyright is given. 1996 by Paul Vincent Spade. All rights reserved. Permission is hereby granted to copy this