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Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
HiL_BlwyszO_tsx1BYAJzvIr09ELyMEMSn_H3tCba_c
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\'Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases\' is a significant article that explores how people make decisions when faced with uncertainty. Authored by renowned psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, this work delves into the mental shortcuts, known as heuristics, that individuals commonly use in judgment and decision-making processes.The article identifies three primary heuristics:Representativeness: This heuristic involves estimating the likelihood of an event by comparing it to an existing prototype in our minds. For example, when trying to determine if someone is a teacher, we might compare them to our mental image of what a typical teacher looks like or behaves.Availability of Instances or Scenarios: This is about judging the frequency or probability of something based on how easily examples come to mind. For instance, if we can quickly think of multiple instances of airplane accidents, we might overestimate the risk of flying.Adjustment from an Anchor: This involves making estimations or decisions starting from an initial value (the anchor) and then adjusting away from it. For example, if a shirt is originally priced at $100 and then marked down to $70, we might see it as a bargain, influenced by the initial price as the anchor.While these heuristics are generally effective and efficient in helping us navigate daily decisions, the article highlights that they can also lead to systematic errors and biases. These biases occur because the shortcuts don't always account for the complexities or variations in real-world situations.Understanding these heuristics and the resulting biases is crucial, especially in fields like economics, psychology, and decision science, as it can lead to more accurate and rational decision-making, particularly in scenarios filled with uncertainty and incomplete information. The insights from this article have profoundly influenced various disciplines, from academic research to practical applications in policy-making, business, and healthcare.

Consequently, if construction, Imaginability plays an important role in the evaluation of probabilities in reallife situations. The risk involved in an adventurous expedition, for example, is evaluated by imagining contingencies not with equipped to cope. If many such difficulties are vividly portrayed, the expedition can be made to appear exceedingly dangerous, although the ease with which disasters are imagined need not reflect their actual likelihood. Conversely, the risk involved in an undertaking may be grossly underestimated if some possible dangers are either difficult to conceive of, or simply do not come to mind. which the expedition is
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Illusory correlation. Chapman and Chapman (8) have described an interesting bias in the judgment of the frequency with which two events co-occur. They presented naive judges with information concerning several hypothetical mental patients. The data for each patient consisted of a clinical diagnosis and a drawing *of a person made by the patient. Later the judges estimated the frequency with which each diagnosis (such as paranoia or suspiciousness) had been accompanied by various features of the drawing (such as peculiar eyes). The subjects markedly overestimated the frequency of co-occurrence of 1128
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This effect was labeled illusory correlation. In their erroneous judgments of the data to which they had been exposed, naive subjects "rediscovered" much of the common, but unfounded, clinical lore concerning the interpretation of the draw-acorrelation person test. The illusory effect was extremely resistant to contradictory data. It persisted even when the correlation between symptom and diagnosis was actually negative, and it prevented the judges from detecting relationships that were in fact present. Availability provides a natural account for the illusory-correlation effect. The judgment of how frequently two events co-occur could be based on the strength of the associative bond between them. When the association is strong, one is likely to conclude that the events have been frequently paired. Consequently, strong associates will be judged to have occurred together trequently. this view, illusory According
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As a result, man has at his disposal a procedure (the availability heuristic) for estimating the numerosity of a class, the likelihood of an event, or the frequency of co-occurrences, by the ease with which the relevant mental operations of retrieval, be construction, performed. However, as the preceding examples have demonstrated, this valuin able estimation procedure results systematic errors. Lifelong experience has instances taught of in general, connections associative association or can
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