4.2.2 Inter-firm applications. Inter-firm articles differ from entrepreneurship policy articles in that they involve interactions between entrepreneurs and other private organizations. We have identified 12 inter-firm articles, with 6 of them specifically focused on venture capital (VC) firms. Henkel et al.s (2015) work offers a fresh perspective on the origins of radical innovation. Traditionally, new entrants in a market are believed to possess a higher capacity for innovation than incumbents, owing to their flexibility and the absence of existing products and customer bases. However, the authors propose another reason for entrants having a higher capacity for radical innovation, which is the existence of a technology market. This market, involving interactions between incumbents and new entrants, motivates new entrants to produce radical innovation since incumbents often acquire new entrants and commercialize their innovations. Similarly, Chou et al. (2016) adopt a behavioral game-t

One is a small firm with an invention, while the second is a larger entrepreneurial firm with more resources. The entrepreneurial firm requires the invention to maintain competitiveness in the market, while the smaller firm needs the larger firms resources and management skills to commercialize its invention. The asymmetry between the two firms and various contextual factors makes an interesting game. The authors make several observations, with one of the most interesting being that if the larger firm is not sluggish and overly risk-averse, and if the smaller firm is not excessively overconfident in achieving a high payoff without the assistance of the larger firm, then two Nash equilibria exist in the game: collaboration (C, C) and no collaboration (N, N) or what the author refers to as the valley of death.

Bade (2018) analyzes the multifaceted benefits of crowdfunding among entrepreneurs, crowdfunders and venture capitalists. The author demonstrates, through a multi-stage bargaining model with a double-sided moral hazard, that entrepreneurs having higher bargaining power do not necessarily translate to benefits for the venture. A higher bargaining power for entrepreneurs results in a reduced probability of crowdfunding success. Thus, the trade-off that entrepreneurs face is between venture quality and crowdfunding success. Further, the author concludes that policy should focus on the bargaining power of crowdfunders if it aims to promote crowdfunding processes and platforms. Fairchild et al. (2019) analyze the factors affecting a development banks choice of a private equity partner when investing in entrepreneurship in emerging markets. The authors present a game-theoretic analysis of how the development banks decisions are affected by economic factors and behavioral characteristics (suc

While the article is not a case study, it incorporates the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as an illustrative example. Archibald and Possani (2021) employ a Markov decision process model to analyze the optimal configuration of the contract between an investor and entrepreneur, where the investor is focused on maximizing net present value, whereas the entrepreneurs main goal is survival. The optimal contract configuration found in this article ideally involves payments that start later and are spread over a long interval, in addition to having a share of the company. It is also found that if the repayments are difficult to meet, entrepreneurs will have a decreased chance of success as they would choose riskier behavior to meet the demands of the repayments. The results of this article are theoretical. Chakraborty and Swinney (2021) investigate challenges related to relaying information about the qualit