In recent years, Western governments have come under sharp criticism for their use of surveillance technology. They have been accused of sweeping up massive amounts of information without evidence of the technologies being effective in improving security. The view of critics is clear, but what do intelligence officials themselves say? This paper analyzes statements of intelligence officials in the U.S. and U.K. from 2006 to 2016, examines what criteria officials use in their discourse on effectiveness, and investigates how considerations of cost and proportionality factor into the equation. It identifies seven measures of effectiveness in the statements of intelligence officials, and finds that cost, though rarely discussed, is the driver behind formalized evaluations of surveillance programs.
· counted. Tactically, how ever, it can be possible to quantify how many terrorists have been identied, how many plots thwarted, etc. It seems intelligence practitioners tailor effectiveness evalu ations to different kinds of intelligence gathering.
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Measures and manner The measure of context points to the way in which practitioners believe evaluations should be conducted. Considering the context and complementary manner in which surveillance technologies are used is a necessary condition for assessing effectiveness. The data on GCHQs measure of support actually highlights two separate metrics of effectiveness. One, the support GCHQ renders other agencies by giving them valuable information gathered via its surveillance systems. Two, the other agencies support of GCHQ and its surveillance systems as evidenced by their acceptance of the allocation of the largest portion of the U.K.s intelligence budget to it. In the other points professionals make about effectiveness, some could be considered to overlap. For example,
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THE INFORMATION SOCIETY lives saved carries us back to thwarting attacks and the issue of counting. If counting attacks thwarted is not a measure of effectiveness, then lives saved cannot be either because this remains in the realm of measuring effectiveness by counting success stories. If counting disrupted plots is used as a measure then this raises the question of whether measuring lives saved is not double counting, counting both the attack prevented and the lives saved from the attack, both of which would be the result of the same intelligence.
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Effectiveness as a percentage The percentages used by ofcials when speaking about effectiveness are interesting in that they point to possible acceptable thresholds of effectiveness. If a surveillance program contributes to 20% of an agencys overall output, this is considered a good gure, presumably well over the threshold. Likewise, a program that maintains 85% of its effectiveness is considered acceptable. In a similar vein, communications data are said to be used in 95% of British criminal cases, which is seen to be an indicator of success, pointing to the effectiveness of the underlying programs. In other words, while presumably a technology is effective in at least some percentage of the cases, in order to be considered effective it must reach a persuasive threshold of percentage of successful cases.
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