335 Rome Statute, supra note 24, Art. 25(3)(f). 336 See Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in Lee (ed.), supra note 326, p. 198; Kai Ambos, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in Triffterer (ed.), supra note 24, p. 488 (observing that the Rome Statute follows one particular legislative approach to criminalising attempt, but does not limit it to any particular crime within the jurisdiction of the Court); Boas, Bischoff, and Reid, supra note 23, pp. 332333.

337 Rome Statute, supra note 24, Art. 25(3)(e). Despite the placement of this provision in the article devoted to forms of responsibility, the drafting history and commentary on Article 25(3)(e) make it clear that it is intended to be treated in the same manner as it is in the ad hoc Tribunals that is, as an inchoate crime, not as a true form of responsibility. See Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, (1999) 10 Criminal Law Forum 11, 14; Ambos, supra note 336, p. 487 ([T]he act of incitement [to genocide] is as such sufficiently dangerous and blameworthy to be punished.); Elies van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 110 ([I]ncitement to commit genocide is an inchoate crime and not a mode of criminal participation[.]).

338 See Saland, supra note 336, p. 200; Schabas, supra note 329, p. 115 (also recalling that direct and public was included in Article III to appease [s]tates that were concerned about threats to freedom of expression). See also Ambos, supra note 336, p. 486 (opining that conduct constituting incitement to commit the other crimes in the Statute is probably captured by the forms of responsibility soliciting and inducing in Article 25(3)(b)). 339 See Antonio Cassese, supra note 80, p. 347 (arguing that customary international law prohibits and makes punishable conspiracy to commit genocide; that is, an inchoate crime consisting of the planning and organizing of genocide not necessarily followed by the perpetration of the crime). See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2784 (2006) (observing that the only conspiracy crimes that have been recognized by international war crimes tribunals are conspiracy to commit genocide and common plan to wage aggressive war).

340 See, e.g., Media Trial Judgement, supra note 100, paras. 10401055, 10921094 (convicting all three accused of conspiracy to commit genocide); Musema Trial Judgement, supra note 9, paras. 184198, 937941 (finding that the prosecution had failed to prove that Musema had conspired with others to commit genocide); Kambanda Trial Judgement, supra note 5, para. 40 & p. 27 (convicting Kambanda of conspiracy to commit genocide). 3.6.1 Genocide in the International Criminal Court civil-law jurisdictions.341 The true effect of the exclusion of a conspiracy provision is still unclear, however, and likely depends on the Courts eventual interpretation of the provision on common-purpose liability in Article 25(3)(d).342