The Origins of Self explores the role that selfhood plays in defining human society, and each human individual in that society. It considers the genetic and cultural origins of self, the role that self plays in socialisation and language, and the types of self we generate in our individual journeys to and through adulthood.Edwardes argues that other awareness is a relatively early evolutionary development, present throughout the primate clade and perhaps beyond, but self-awareness is a product of the sharing of social models, something only humans appear to do. The self of which we are aware is not something innate within us, it is a model of our self produced as a response to the models of us offered to us by other people. Edwardes proposes that human construction of selfhood involves seven different types of self. All but one of them are internally generated models, and the only non-model, the actual self, is completely hidden from conscious awareness. We rely on others to tell us about our self, and even to let us know we are a self.Developed in relation to a range of subject areas – linguistics, anthropology, genomics and cognition, as well as socio-cultural theory – The Origins of Self is of particular interest to students and researchers studying the origins of language, human origins in general, and the cognitive differences between human and other animal psychologies.
Culus Co ME fro M? 113 114 altruistic punishers. Boyd et al. (2010) showed that this sharing of costs means that punishment can proliferate in a cooperating group; and Fowler (2005) found that, in a mixed population of contributors, defectors and nonparticipants, the appearance of altruistic punishers led to their dominating the population. Additionally, he found that punishment does not work unless the net payoff for the population is positive.
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However, all these simulations can only show what should logically happen. What is the situation in the actual world? Riehl and Frederickson (2016) looked at the evidence from a range of cooperative animals and noticed that cheating and punishment are both uncommon. Instead, they found that uncooperative animals are usually not cheating to gain advantage, but just to survive: they do not cooperate because they do not have the spare resources to cooperate. However, failure to cooperate in a cooperative species is likely to disadvantage the noncooperator even further:
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Contrary to what is typically assumed, not cooperating is rarely an adaptive strategy for social animals; when cooperation generates direct or inclusive fitness benefits, a failure to cooperate lowers an animals lifetime fitness. In these societies, cheating is not selectively favoured in the first place and noncooperative phenotypes may be maintained only in mutationselection balance. If cheaters are therefore rare, they are unlikely to impose much selection for punishment. These results are consistent with recent theory, which has increasingly shown that punishment even in humans can be evolutionarily stable only under limited circumstances, and that cooperation is unlikely to evolve when cheating is truly advantageous.
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(Riehl and Frederickson 2016, 9) In this situation, punishment of cheats is overkill and has disadvantages for the group. Where altruistic punishment does exist, it is usually punishment for a positive action, not for negative inaction. Riehl and Frederickson propose that altruistic punishment of active cheats, noncooperators and freeriders evolves separately in each case, and that the evolution of punishment probably precedes the evolution of cooperation. The occurrence of all three in a single species is, therefore, quite unusual. Yet, somehow, humans have moved from vengeful individual punishment to organised altruistic punishment of cheats (using a sense of fairness), of noncooperators (using social morality) and of freeriders (using cultural prescription). thE or igins of sElf
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