Despite President Reagan’s historic foreign policy success in ushering in the collapse of the Soviet Union and liberation of Eastern Europe, the loss of life during the Beirut Marine barracks bombing marks a substantial failure in Reagan’s foreign policy record. Reagan’s foreign policy failure in Beirut that resulted in the deaths of 241 Americans merits further examination amongst students of international relations as this peacekeeping mission illustrates the dangers of sending American troops into harm’s way without a clear and decisive goal and exit strategy. By evaluating the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing, the hindsight and judgment of history allows for more thorough analysis of the consequences of committing peacekeeping forces without determining the justification, or purpose, for deploying American troops and without fully recognizing the planned exit strategy. It is therefore instructive to examine President Reagan’s decision to deploy American peacekeeping forces into Lebanon, the military rationale behind committing troops, along with applying the lessons of this tragedy for future conflict resolution.
10 Bellinger: Keepers of the Peace or Soldiers: An Analysis of the 1983 Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing and the Rationale Behind Deploying Troops in a Peacekeeping Capacity Keepers of the Peace or Soldiers Bellinger 10 in terms of its global containment of the Soviet Union and communism and thus viewed regional conflicts in Cold War terms.51 Additionally, Robert Dallek found that the Reagan administration was not experienced in addressing Middle East policy.52 President Reagans National Security Adviser Robert (Bud) McFarlane provided additional insight into Reagans inexperience with Middle East policy. According to McFarlane & Smardz, Reagan unfortunately had no historical framework for dealing with what he was seeing, having never read accounts of what had tragically been very nearly a routine of massacres and counter-massacres among communal
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53 Shultz further recalled that following the Marine barracks bombing, we replaced our marine contingent and continued our effort to help the Lebanese out of their civil war and into a process of reconciliation.54 Shultz also argued that had Israel been willing to reduce its forces and had the United States been more confident and determined in our deployments, the outcome might have been different.55 Therefore, both President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz believed that their foreign policy strategy of helping Lebanon would produce the intended benefits. The October 23, 1983, bombing of the Beirut Marine barracks was a pivotal event that led to the withdrawal of American troops in the region. Furthermore, the implications of withdrawing American troops
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51 Bradley Lynn Coleman and Kyle Longley, Reagan and the World: Leadership and National Security, 1981-1989 Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2017, pp. 256-257. 52 Robert Dallek, Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. 53 Robert C. McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, Special Trust Cadell & Davies, 1994, p. 211. 54 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State C. Scribner's Sons, 1993, pp. 227-228. 55 Ibid., p. 234. 11 Published by Scholars Crossing, 2023 Bound Away: The Liberty Journal of History, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 , Art. 2 Keepers of the Peace or Soldiers Bellinger 11 following the terrorist attack may have contributed to future terrorist activities in the years to
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56 In reviewing the impact of the attack on U.S. peacekeeping forces in Beirut in 1983, it is further instructive to consider the decision to commit troops and the rationale under which the troops would be removed. Weinberger & Roberts contended that the first multi-national force sent into Beirut had a clearly defined goal and endgame, while the exact purpose of the second multi-national forces presence was unclear.57 General Colin Powell & Persico noted that, our Marines had been stationed in Lebanon for the fuzzy idea of providing a presence The United States was attempting to referee the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. The Marines were to remain between two powder kegs.58 Powell & Persico also observed that, what I saw from my perch in the Pentagon was America sticking its hand into a thousand-yearold hornets nest with the expectation that our mere presence might pacify the hornets.59
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