The 'Critique of Judgment' is a philosophical work by Immanuel Kant, published in 1790 as the third of his critical writings. It is divided into two main parts: the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment. In this work, Kant explores the nature of aesthetic judgments, which he refers to as 'judgments of taste,' and their claim to universal validity despite being based on individual subjective feelings. He also delves into the concept of teleological judgment, discussing the apparent purpose and design in nature. The 'Critique of Judgment' is known for its discussions on aesthetics, teleology, and the nature of beauty, and it is considered a significant and profound work in Kant's philosophical output. The book's exploration of diverse topics and its increasing recognition in the last few decades have contributed to its importance in the study of Kant's philosophy.
Even if they too deserve to be considered in the universal theory of the purposiveness of natural things generally. still that theory would belong elsewhere, namely, to metaphysics, and would not constitute an inherent principle of natural science. In the case of the empirical laws of natural purposes in organized beings, on the other hand, it is presumably not only permissible, but also unavoidable, to use the teleological way of judging as a principle of natural science when dealing with a special class of its objects.
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Now in order to keep physics strictly within its bounds, we there abstract entirely from the question as to whether natural purposes are purposes intentionally or unintentionally, since otherwise we would be meddling in extraneous affairs (namely, those of metaphysics). We settle for regarding natural purposes as objects that are explicable solely in terms of natural laws that must be conceived of by using the idea of purposes as principle, and that are even internally cognizable only in this way as regards their intrinsic form. Therefore we must avoid any suspicion, in physics, that we might presume to mix something in with our bases of cognition that does not belong to physics at all-viz., a supernatural cause. That is why, when in teleology we speak of nature as if the purposiveness in it were intentional, we do so in such a way that we attribute this intention to nature, i.e., to matter. This serves to indicate that this term refers here only to a principle of reflective, rather
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(It indicates this inasmuch as no one would attribute to lifeless material an intention in the proper sense of the term, and so no misunderstanding can arise.) It indicates, therefore, that we are not trying to introduce [into physics 1 a special causal basis, but are trying to introduce only another method for our use of reason in investigation a method different from the one in terms of mechanical laws-in order to compensate for the inadequacy we find in the latter method when we search even empirically for all the particular laws of nature. Thus, when we apply teleology to physics, we do quite rightly speak of nature's wisdom, parsimony, foresight, or beneficence. But in speaking this way we do not turn nature into an intelligent [verstandigl being (since that would be absurd), nor are we so bold as to posit a different, intelligent being above nature as its architect, since that would be
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263 383 384 264 PART II. CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT presumptuous.46 Rather, we use these terms only to designate a kind of causality of nature by analogy with the causality we have in the technical use of reason, since that helps us to keep in view the rule we must follow in investigating certain products of nature.
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